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Introduction
In 1989, Francis Fukuyama announced “the end of history.”2 This was not the
first time this bold claim had been made, for Hegel had argued as much about Napoleon’s
victory at Jena in 1806. But Fukuyama was not declaring the triumph of the state-nation,
as Hegel had done.3 Rather, he was saying that the great struggle between democracy,
fascism and communism was over. After defeating the Axis in World War II, and
following the fall of the Iron Curtain, Fukuyama believed that democracy had triumphed
and would, henceforth, be the preferred model for State4 government.5
It now appears that, like Hegel, Fukuyama was mistaken in his claim for the end
of history. While it is true that democracy defeated fascism and communism in the
ideological struggle for political dominance, the State as we know it continues to evolve.
History has not ended. The story continues, and as has been the case before it is only the
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The state-nation is the constitutional manifestation of the state that is characterized by a mobilization of a
nation, that is, "a national, ethnocultural group" to benefit the State. See infra note 4. This form of the State,
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nature of the State6 that is changing.7 Identifying these changes, gauging their
significance, and evaluating their relationship with respect to other features of the
relations between states is central to understanding how and why the State continues to
evolve.
Recent scholarship on the State has largely focused on foreign policy, that is, the
“strategic” aspects of the relations between states.8 One of the more interesting claims in
this regard is that the very nature of the State (what we call Statecraft) has evolved in
response to developments unique to the twentieth century.9 These developments, which
include the commodification of weapons of mass destruction and the diminished
importance of sovereignty,10 have engendered a new approach to strategy.11 From the
6

The State is both a political institution and an idea. Two of the defining features of the modern form of
the State –sovereignty and control of power – are connected to two larger dimensions of the State, which
we will call the inner and the outer. The most obvious aspect of sovereignty is control over geography.
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Some see the end of the State marked by a transition to other, more complicated organizing forms. See
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PHILIP BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 677-714. The five developments are: (1) an international system of trade
and finance that promotes exchanges of goods, and talent, and the free movement of capital; (2) threats that
do not observe national boundaries (e.g., AIDS and SARS); (3) loss of state control over culture; (4)
commodification of weapons of mass destruction; and (5) a global system of human rights which imposes
legal rules on nations that have not been ratified by the nation-state.
10

For discussion, see, K.J. Keith, Sovereignty at the Beginning of the 21 st Century: Fundamental or
Outmoded? 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 581 (2004). For discussion of sovereignty in the context of the WTO,
see KENT JONES, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE WTO? 92-104 (2004). A strong defense of sovereignty in the
context of international law and constitutional government is found in JEREMY A. RABKIN. LAW WITHOUT
NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005).
11

See Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February
(2004) (arguing for pre-emptive military action in a world of global terrorism and WMD). See also

3

perspective of strategy, this development requires us to rethink the basis for the State’s
claim to legitimacy in the 21st century.12 Given its importance, it is no surprise that many
scholars have devoted their attention to changes in strategy and their relation to the
continuing evolution of the State.13 We agree that the State is changing. We further
agree that these changes require a rethinking of strategic defense in a world of
asymmetric warfare and global networked terrorism.14 We do not intend to add to the
literature on strategy, however. Our project draws upon this literature, but is distinctly
different.
Our project examines the extent to which the global trade system15 should respond
to fundamental shifts in the nature of the State and of international relations.16 Our thesis
is that, much like the strategic and foreign policy of states is linked to their internal
constitutional order,17 the trade policy of states is another external dimension of the State

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY 98 (2004)
(“[T]he existence of WMD in the hands of non-state actors poses a new and extremely severe type of
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The “internal constitutional order” is expressed through law, both public and private. BOBBITT, supra
note 3, at xxiii.
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and also connected to the State’s inner order (law). The experience of the 20th century
shows that states must acknowledge overarching structural changes within their domestic
spheres, then identify in a timely fashion how these shifts affect their interaction with the
rest of the international economic community. In turn, states must adjust `external trade
policy objectives and strategies of the international community to accord with their
intrinsic political and ideological goals. The failure to do so at the appropriate time will
hamper the internal economic health of states and may also hamper free states in
existential struggles against totalitarian movements.18
Our article proceeds in three principal parts. In Part I, we provide a detailed
defense of the claim that history has not ended and, further, why the State continues to
evolve in the twenty-first century. We identify the modern states of the 20th century as
nation-states. These states were born out of the prior evolutionary stage of the State,
during which the State sought to solidify itself by drawing on its subjects as a supportive
bloc and, in the process, created the nation whose welfare and security became the
legitimating basis of the State. Modern states maintained security vis-a-vis one another
through a balance of powers.19 They used law to foster the welfare of the nation. While
Europe and the United States, among others, took different routes to welfare, the welfare
systems of the modern states had as their common denominator a commitment to the
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While we do discuss many events, both current and historical, this is an essay about ideas. Mindful that
“[i]deas are always both lagging and leading indicators of reality” (H.W. Brands, Ideas and Foreign Affairs
in A COMPANION TO FOREIGN RELATIONS 1-14 (Robert Schulzinger ed., 2002)), we attempt to get ahead of
coming events and anticipate those events with ideas that will accommodate a future toward which the
states that comprise the world trading system are already moving.
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For discussion of balance of powers and a defense of “Offensive Realism,” see JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER,
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nation as the basis for their legitimacy.20 We posit that, in the 21st century, the modern
states are being replaced by post-modern states. There are several reasons for this,
including the inability of states to maintain the provision of welfare as a legitimating
basis and to guarantee security when confronted with global networked terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, and the proliferation of diffuse threats.
Part II argues that, just like law and strategy evolve through an interdependent and
dynamic relationship, Statecraft and the international commercial order of states
engender each other’s evolution. The domestic constitutional architecture of the State,21
such as its organization around a nation and its legitimization through the promotion of
that nation’s welfare, have profound repercussions on the ordering of the international
trade system. At the same time, shifts in the foundational rules of the international trade
system and in patterns of international economic activity (such as the rise of a new set of
international economic actors or transformations in currency markets) affect the ability of
the State to maintain its domestic statecraft and tend to transform the inner order of the
State. Like Jacob’s ladder, the State and the order of states are animated by a constant
interaction going from bottom to top, and vice versa, in a dynamic motion that shape both
spheres and, in turn, propels them forward through various stages of history. Just as
Fukuyama and Hegel were misled into thinking that strategic and political history ended,
theorists of trade might misinterpret a historical transformation of sufficient significance
as sounding the end of trade history. In truth, however, the story continues.
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A recent discussion is found in Arthur Waldron, Europe’s Crisis, COMMENTARY, __-__, July-August
2003.
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We will explain below the meaning of constitutional choices, as used in this context.
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We support our theory in Part II by an analysis of the relationship between trade
and the State over the course of the last two world wars, culminating with Bretton
Woods. We explain why Bretton Woods accorded with the essential elements of
Statecraft in the modern world. We argue that the institutionalization of comparative
advantage by Bretton Woods was only another stage in the evolution of the State.
Bretton Woods set in motion transformations in the order of states which, in turn,
contributed to the continued metamorphosis of Statecraft, and made a new trade order of
states necessary.
In Part III, we explain how the Bretton Woods order is becoming obsolete
because of fundamental shifts in Statecraft. We begin by explaining how the main
interpretive and institutional issues that faced the Bretton Woods system, and its World
Trade Organization successor, were a function of Statecraft in the modern world of
nation-states. We claim that the nexus between the inner and outer dimensions of the
State is gradually pushing the trade world to revisit its reliance on comparative advantage
as the animating norm of the trading system. We argue that a new Bretton Woods is
needed and, with it, a new legitimating trade norm for states, one we identify as
“enablement of global economic opportunity.” We do not merely recommend a new
global trade norm. We complete our argument with a description of a new set of global
institutions for world trade, institutions that enable us to make sense of current changes as
we approach an uncertain future.
The upshot of our argument is three-fold: (i) first, history never ends, and the
interdependent mechanics of Statecraft and the order of states will, in each generation,
usher in the need for revising the international commercial order and have a new
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constitutional moment; (ii) second, theoreticians and planners of trade can predict not
only the issues that a trade system will generate at any moment in history, but also
decipher and anticipate the contours of the next generation. To do this, however, they
must understand the mechanics of Statecraft and the order of states. (ii) third, each
constitutional moment is bound to set in motion transformative mechanisms that
essentially plant the seeds of the succeeding generation, and the time has come for a new
constitutional moment of trade. Our goal is to outline the contours of the new
constitutional moment that we believe is needed and of the era that it should usher in.

I. The End of History…and Its Continuation
Fukuyama’s end of history begins in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The
Second World War ended with the demise of fascism. The fall of the Wall in 1989
marked the endgame for communism and, with it, the triumph of democracy.22
According to Robert Cooper, 1989 did not mark the end of history, but rather set the
stage for the emergence of a new form of the State – the “post-modern state.”23
Similarly, Philip Bobbitt rejects Fukuyama’s claim and sees 1989 as a step in the
evolution of the State.24 He identifies the new form of the State as the “market-state”
which, he argues, will succeed the nation-state. These two theorists of the State agree on
a number of defining characteristics of the new form of State that, in their view, confirm
the continuing evolution of the State. Further, their theories point to a nexus and an
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For historical details, see FRANCOIS FURET, THE PASSING OF AN ILLUSION (Deborah Furet trans. 2000).
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See Cooper, supra note 8, at 26 (identifying “post-modern Europe” with The Treaty of Rome (1957) and
the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe).
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See BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 611-639.
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interplay between the inner face of the state (its constitutional order) and its strategic
foreign policy and military objectives. We think Bobbitt and Cooper are right about the
State.25 But the story they tell is incomplete.
The State has both internal and external dimensions. States express their relations
with other states in two aspects. The first is through strategy. The most obvious example
of strategy is war. Strategic decisions are connected to the inner dimension of the State
through law. The second external dimension of the State is trade. Like strategy, trade is
a matter of the relations between and among states. And as with strategy, the outer
dimension of trade is internally expressed through law. Taken together, Statecraft
consists of strategy and trade, the two outer dimensions of the State.
The modern era of strategy, which ended around 1989, spanned the better part of
the 20th century, commencing with World War I, continuing through the defeat of fascism
and ending with the fall of communism. During that period, the liberal democracies
organized themselves as modern welfare nation-states.26 A commitment to sovereignty
drove the internal and external dimensions of the modern state.27 Modern states adhered
to relatively absolutist notions of sovereignty over internal policy choices and external
policy and military objectives.28 The notion of sovereignty was intricately linked to the
nation as a constitutive feature of the State, to welfare as the legitimating drive of the
State, and to the balance of powers as a key component of the State’s external strategy.
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We note that even Marxists affirm the evolution of the State over claims for its demise. See ANTONIO
NEGRI & MICHAEL HARDT, EMPIRE (2001) and MULTITUDE (2004).
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For ease of reference, we will refer to these as “modern states.”
See generally, BOBBITT, supra note 3, at xxv-xxvii.
Id.
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Sovereignty is tied to the idea of the nation. The essential goal of the State was to
protect the nation against external threats and to provide for its internal welfare. Thus,
modern states would tolerate few intrusions into their domestic affairs. From a military
standpoint, the sovereignty principle was enshrined in the U.N. Charter, which prohibits
states from violating one another’s sovereignty unless acting in self-defense or in defense
of an allied state that has itself been invaded.29 This principle held fast through the end of
the 20th century wars with one important exception, that of colonial wars.30
The other corollary of the notion of sovereignty for nation-states was the idea of
equal rights between states. At the United Nations, for example, a fiction was
maintained, (albeit tempered by rules such as the Security Council veto that recognized
the superior power of World War II’s victors) that each nation had an equal vote. The
internal model of the State that Fukuyama described, characterized by a commitment to
the protection of individual rights and the consent of the governed, was replicated
internationally. The intended outcome was a society of modern nation-states that would
have formal equality, and that could not violate each other’s territory. Throughout this
period of history, sovereignty had been inextricably tied to the concept of a nation. The
nation was sovereign, and although it was largely ethnic, it defined itself by its physical
borders and the population that it had inherited throughout centuries of evolution.
Having grown and become more powerful, the modern state underwent a metamorphosis
from state-nation, a state supported by a nation, to nation-state, a state supporting its
nation. The primary means of support was the notion of welfare - coupled with a system
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Art. 51, U.N. Charter, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
For discussion of colonial wars, see infra at text accompanying notes 31-35.
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of protection of minority rights or rights deemed fundamental - as its legitimating
objective.
Europe and the United States differed in their domestic approach to providing
welfare to the citizenry. Europe had a stronger set of social entitlements, such as
unemployment benefits, large family allowances, strong employee protection, early and
generous retirement benefits, just to name a few features. For several reasons, some
historical and some structural, the United States did not adopt social entitlement packages
to the extent that Europe had.31 Nevertheless, like Europe, the legitimacy of the
government of the United States depended in substantial part on its promotion of the
welfare of large middle and working classes.32
On the international scene, the society of modern nation-states attempted again to
export its domestic ideas. The discourse over development, for example, has been
dominated by the model of the sovereign nation-state and its extension of welfare to other
sovereign nations. Africa is a prime example of this phenomenon. The modern
sensibility could not tolerate colonialism. It viewed the African peoples as “foreign
nations,” whose status as nations entitled them to a state. Not surprisingly, the idea of
“the nation” also made its way to the colonized, who often came to age and were
educated in systems that viewed the nation-state, governed by democratic principles, as
the ultimate form of human organization. The result was a push to end colonialism and
to substitute a government of the nation (at least formally) for that of the colonizers; put
otherwise, the colonized became unwilling to live under a state controlled by another
31

For discussion and possible explanation, see JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLRIDGE, THE RIGHT
NATION: CONSERVATIVE POWER IN AMERICA (2004).
32

COOPER, supra note 8, at 42-43.
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“nation,” and made it difficult for the colonizer to retain such control.33 The upshot
(which of course did not come to pass) would be a nation state governed by democratic
principles, which would gradually develop and achieve parity with its Western big
siblings.
Lastly, the notion of balance of power was linked to the concepts of sovereignty
and of the nation as the interlocutor of the state in its quest for legitimacy. In the modern
system, nation-states with strong sovereign powers maintained international orders by
balancing each other’s powers. Balance of powers, rather than the hegemonic
domination of an empire or superpower, was the preferred method of achieving order.34
The modern world viewed states as equal citizens of world society. The concept of
hegemony was antithetical to this worldview, however fictional or detached from reality
it might have been. Thus, it was the alternative, an order based on balance among equals
(or a substantial group of equals), that came to dominate the Western world in the modern
era.
Today, the modern state is gradually declining in various parts of the world but
especially so in Europe. To be sure, the nations of the world continue to adhere to a
substantial extent to territorial and constitutional Statecraft of the kind that emerged in
the 20th century. However, a foundational transformative shift similar to the one that
brought about the nation-state in the 20th century is taking place.
The first essential characteristic of the society of post-modern states that is
relevant to our thesis is that notions of sovereignty and borders are gradually losing the
33

See FRANZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1965).
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When he wedded balance of powers to the idea of “containment,” George Kennan authored the US
approach to the Cold War. See X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 566-582 (1947).
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central role they played in the modern era.35 Increasingly, post- modern states accept, to
various degrees, control-sharing over domestic matters with supranational or global
regimes and institutions.36 Next, states are experiencing a loss of domestic control
because, as we will describe further later, traditional tools for regulating industry, such as
monetary policy, have been rendered less effective by increasingly diffuse, cross-border
forces, and because of the rise of environmental, health and security threats that are also
too diffuse to be controlled by domestic policy only.37 Further, the once-rigid
international rules on the use of force have given way to a nascent principle of customary
international law that permits foreign intervention in the affairs of a state that engages in
egregious violations of human rights (e.g., Serbia, Rwanda) or threaten sensitive areas of
international finance or commerce.38 All in all, sovereignty, while still a foundational
basis of international relations, is gradually eroding.
Welfare has also begun to fade as the legitimating basis for the State.39 The
decline of welfare is taking two discrete forms: the strong pressure in Continental Europe
on the cradle to grave systems established in the 20th century40 and, perhaps more
significantly, the failure of the welfare state to take root in the South. Europe is
35

See ROBERT COOPER, supra note 8, at 66-67.
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Id. at 27 (“The legitimate monopoly on force that is the essence of statehood is thus subject to
international – but self-imposed – constraints.”).
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Id. at 102.
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Id. at 59.
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See BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 240-242.

40

The situation is most acute in Germany. See Mark Landler, German Joblessness Rises As Benefits Are
Reduced, Late Edition - Final , Section C , Page 5 , Column 1, 2/3/2005. The complexities of the German
context are discussed in PETER BLESES & MARTIN SEELEIB-KAIER, THE DUAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
GERMAN WELFARE STATE (2004). See also GABOR STEINGART, DEUTSCHLAND: DER ABSTIEG EINES
SUPERPOWER (2004) (the story of Germany’s decline since 1945).
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witnessing a dual internal phenomenon when it comes to welfare. In part, the welfare
system is viewed as an inalienable set of social rights, a core component of the acquis
social set of progressive measures that should never be reversed. Britain, for example, is
increasing its public spending on welfare.41 In France, any governmental attempt to
decrease the level of benefits in a meaningful manner is sure to be met with unrest and
protest of the kind that paralyzed the country at various times in recent years. At the
same time, the State by all accounts is rapidly losing its ability to sustain the welfare
programs. The aging of the European population endangers retirement schemes. The
economic burdens placed on employers are deterring employment, social mobility, and
fluid growth, and they consistently fall short of generating the income necessary to shore
up the system, which is constantly running at a deficit.
The South provides an even bleaker illustration of the waning of welfare. The
adoption by decolonized nations of the boundaries inherited from colonial powers was,
by and large, not followed by the adoption of welfare systems that replicate the West’s.
The reasons are manifold. In many countries, particular ethnic or other discrete groups
vied for power and control of resources to be redistributed among themselves, not to the
“nation.” The nation, for that matter, did not really exist. It was created by the colonial
powers and used as a catalyst and focal point for achieving independence. When
domestic politics started to take their course, the groupings began to focus more on
ethnic, tribal, and other more natural identification markers, and less on the concept of
the nation as defined in colonial times. Furthermore, on a fundamental economic level,

41

2004 HM SPENDING REVIEW, PN A2,12 July 2004,http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/spending_review/spend_sr04/press/spend_sr04_press13.cfm; see also Rachel Smithes,
Public and Private Welfare Activity in the United Kingdom, 1979-1999, available at
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/CASEpaper93.pdf
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the developing countries did not follow the industrialization and “state-nation”
strengthening pattern that characterized the West. They inherited a State, which was
viewed from the West with lenses developed through centuries of a unique history, but
which in reality had as little likelihood of pursuing its citizens’ welfare than, say, the
French Kingdoms that preceded the Revolution.
The difficulty of achieving welfare will arguably lead governments to shift their
focus towards the maximization of economic opportunity. Such policies could take many
forms. In Japan, for example, the government may focus on subsidizing research and
development to give domestic industries the best possible edge.42 Elsewhere, the
emphasis may be on providing education and infrastructure, all the while deregulating
markets.43 In yet other societies, the emphasis may be on creating commercial structures
that give workers ownership stakes, so as to maximize their opportunity for economic
advancement.44 In all events, the bottom line is that instead of focusing on ensuring the
welfare of everyone, the State will gradually shift its foundational approach towards
maximizing the economic opportunity available to all. While welfare policies of course
continue to obtain in Europe and throughout the world, the tide of history seems to shift
away from welfare as the core element of Statecraft that was axiomatic in the modern
world.
In sum, the developments described above have resulted in a trend towards the
modern state’s loss of its ability to control the domestic arena and to enact policies that
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BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 284.
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Id. at 670-71.

44

Id. at 673.
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would protect the welfare of the nation.45 To be sure, the world is not completely postmodern. As Cooper notes,46 post-modern states live alongside modern and even premodern states.47 In addition, there are various pre-modern states on the international
scene, where the official organs of the State do not even enjoy exclusive use of force
within their own borders. Nevertheless, we believe that the trend that we are describing
provides an accurate account of a transformational move in Statecraft and international
relations.

45

For an insightful analysis of the complex relation between states and transnational firms and control of
the domestic arena, see Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE
AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 91-110 (Rodney B. Hall and Thomas J. Bierstecker eds. 2002).
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See COOPER, supra note 8, at 16-26.
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Certain important players on the international scene, such as Indonesia and India, may still qualify as
modern states. These states, while operating in an increasingly post-modern world, continue to adhere to
notions of sovereignty and nation, and they are not characterized by the same degree of diffuseness that is
increasingly apparent in post-modern states. Cf., e.g., Gurcharan Das, Is India Shining? WALL ST. J. EUR.,
May 4, 2004, at A8 (discussing India’s drive to achieve ‘nation-building’ through economic success).
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II: Jacob’s Ladder: Statecraft, Trade and the Order of States: A Theory of
Interwoven Mechanics
The foundational notions of the international trading system reflect not so much
the outcome of a material dialectic among states (e.g., the historical recognition of the
damage that arose from the failure to follow a comparative advantage model) but rather
they arise from the interwoven architecture of State and of the international trade order of
states, and from the dynamic evolution of both planes that stem from parallel yet related
metamorphoses. Transformations in domestic statecraft drive the evolution of the
international trade order and, in turn, transformative shifts on the international
commercial plane tend to change the domestic configuration of the State.
This relationship of interdependence and connectedness is dynamic and manifests
itself on a foundational level. The domestic constitutional architecture of the State,48
such as its organization around a nation and its self-legitimization through the promotion
of that nation’s welfare,49 have profound repercussions on the ordering of the
international trade system.50 At the same time, shifts in the foundational rules of the
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We will explain below the meaning of constitutional choices, as used in this context.
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We use the concept of welfare to capture broadly the policies of the nation-state that foster a broad level
of acceptance of the modern liberal democracies by the different elements of the constituent nations.
Western Europe, Asia and the United States were the more powerful elements of the players on the
international order. In addition to its security and strategic functions, the State as lived by all these players
redistributed wealth, provided a safety net for the nation, and protected economic and other rights for broad
segments of the population. The policy choices and the law that sprung from this fundamental element of
Statecraft spanned a substantial part of the inner order of the states (including labor laws, unemployment
benefits, retirement rules, aid to families, taxation law, subsidies, public investment and other central
components of the domestic legal and regulatory order). As discussed below, nation-states such as France,
the United States or Japan took different approaches to achieving welfare, but their inner orders shared the
essential hallmarks of legitimacy of the nation-state in relation to the nation.
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The association of welfare with the nation-state deepened as the 20th century, Cooper’s modern era. See
Michael Hart, Coercion or Cooperation: Social Policy and Future Trade Negotiations, 20 Can.-U.S. L.J.
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international trade system and in patterns of international economic activity, such as the
rise of a new set of international economic actors or transformations in currency markets,
affect the ability of the State to maintain its domestic statecraft and tend to transform the
inner order of the State.51 Like Jacob’s ladder, the State and the order of states are
animated by a constant interaction going from bottom to top, and vice versa, in a dynamic
motion that shape both spheres and, in turn, propel them forward through various stages
of history. Just as Fukuyama and Hegel were lured into thinking that strategic and
political history ended, trade theorists might misinterpret a historical transformation of
sufficient significance as sounding the end of trade history. In truth, however, the story is
always bound to continue.
As detailed below, the dynamic relationship of interdependence and
connectedness between State and the order of states may be observed at a descriptive
level. In addition, as a normative matter, states must acknowledge overarching structural
changes within their domestic sphere as well as on the international plane, and quickly
identify how these shifts affect their interaction with the rest of the international
economic community. Trade policy must then be adjusted to accord with internal
political and ideological goals and with the evolving international scene. To be sure,
351, 377 (“Over the course of the twentieth century, the attributes of the nation-state grew further to
embrace the social welfare state. By the middle of the century, attributes of the nation-state included not
only territorial and national integrity, but also the capacity to promote the economic and social well-being
of its citizens. At the same time, the post-war system of multilateral rules and organizations became the
latest expression of rules to govern inter-state relations. As with the expansion in the attributes of the
nation-state, the range of issues addressed by the rules of inter-state relations had similarly expanded.”)
51

Id. (“Today we face a new reality. Advances in transportation and communications technology have
made it possible to breach the territorial, social and cultural integrity of the nation-state on a daily basis.
The convergence of popular cultures and the crisis of the welfare state all point to the need to develop a
new definition of sovereignty as well as a new set of norms and rules for inter-state relations. In short, we
need a new set of rules that recognizes that the realm of goods, services, capital and technology has largely
escaped from the effective regulation of the territorial nation-state, while its people remain largely attached
to it.”)
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structural shifts do not happen overnight. However, there comes a point in time when a
constitutional moment is needed. States must come together then and recognize that
Statecraft and the order of states has undergone a metamorphosis of sufficient maturity
and magnitude to warrant a new set of constitutional rules.52
The constitutional moment is a rite of passage, in that it marks an international
awareness that change has happened, and a crucial exercise in recognizing the nature of
the change and in instilling throughout the system fundamental new norms that will take
their course throughout the new era. The states’ failure to recognize the constitutional
moment will not only prejudice them economically, but also possibly hamper the
achievement of their non-trade strategic foreign policy objectives. Ending history, then,
is not only an academic and intellectual mistake; rather, it is as dangerous an illusion as
believing that invaders may be repelled in World War II with a Maginot Line born out of
World War I, in that the human difficulty in stepping out of deeply rooted paradigms to
look at the future is bound to generate defeat in the present.
We have selected the 20th century as a historical prism from which to illustrate
our theory, focusing on the GATT/WTO, but also making incursions into the European
Union and regional arrangements such as the NAFTA to illustrate our point on a
comparative basis.
A. Failure and Redemption.

52

We argue in Part III that such a constitutional moment has become necessary in the early part of the 20th
century. As illustrated in various contexts below, we use the notion of constitutional moment as a
conscious choice based on the interaction of Statecraft as inner law. It relates less to a change in the
ordering of society that legitimizes the adoption of certain constitutional norms, than to the infusion of new
norms to recognizing the interaction between inner state order and the international order of states. Cf.
Bruce Ackerman, Fidelity as Synthesis, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1519 (1997)(Ackerman defines a
constitutional moment as a moment that "occurs when a rising political movement succeeds in placing a
new problematic at the center of American political life).
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The 20th century trade story, as classically told, is one of failure and redemption.
In this instance, beginning the inquiry with an exploration of redemption, and telling the
story with the voice of an economist, makes the contours of failure clearer. Redemption
happens after World War II, with the incorporation into the GATT of the theories of
absolute and comparative advantage developed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo.53
Both economists posited that states would maximize their wealth by unilaterally
eliminating import restrictions.54 However, they did not address the use of law to erect
an international system that would institutionalize their economic insights.55 The GATT
did that. At its core, the GATT established three “disciplines” that removed states’
ability to discriminate against one another in an effort to protect the domestic economy:
tariff bindings, a non-discrimination norm applicable to internal taxation and regulation,
and a prohibition of quotas and like measures.56
The first anti-protectionism discipline created a framework for the GATT
Contracting Parties to bind the tariffs that they imposed on foreign products, the primary
protectionist barrier of the first half of the 20th Century.57 The GATT did not require its
constituent states actually to reduce tariffs. Rather, the regulatory framework called for
53

See KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, GATT-THINK (Nat’ Bureau of Econ. Research,
Discussion Paper No. 8005 (2000).
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See, e.g., JACQUES MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2001).
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Robert Howse, Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO: From Politics to Technocracy – and Back
Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 A.J.I.L. 94 (2002).
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This removal of barriers to trade spurned a sharp increase in cross border economic activities among
nation-states over the second half of the twentieth century. The GATT took off with [23] Contracting
Parties, gradually took hold in over [150] nations. It progressively reached to new subject matter areas,
such as intellectual property and trade in services. These developments are what grants to Bretton Woods,
in retrospect, its status as a constitutional moment.
57

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT].
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multilateral negotiations of ceilings (the “bindings”) that, once agreed upon, would
establish the maximum duty that the concerned state may legally apply for the relevant
product category.58 In turn, each state committed, under the Most Favored Nation Clause
of the GATT, to extend to all trading partners the lowest tariff concession chosen by the
state with respect to any partner. This framework created an institutional framework for
the gradual reduction by the Contracting Parties of global tariffs. This structure
generated eight rounds of trade negotiations, and a drastic reduction of the global tariff
barriers to trade that prevailed before Bretton Woods.59
The second discipline required the Contracting Parties to respect a nondiscrimination norm that guarantees all imported products the same treatment as “like”
domestic products with respect to internal taxation and regulation.60 At its core, the
“national treatment” discipline prevents the circumvention of a tariff binding by the
imposition of a discriminatory burden in the form of, by way of example, internal sales
tax. 61
The concept of discrimination is of course laden with ambiguity and has
generated substantial controversy, in no small part because it has brought to the

58

The tariff bindings system was supplemented by the Most Favored Nation clause of the GATT. The
tariff bindings, as explained in the text, established a maximum allowable tariff. Correlatively, it left each
Contracting Party free to lower their tariffs with respect to any trading partner. Under the MFN principle,
however, each Contracting Party had to extend to all other GATT members the lowest tariff rate applied by
the Contracting Party in any product category. GATT art. II.
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The GATT sought to “tariffy” barriers to trade so as to establish a transparent framework for tariff
reduction negotiations in successive “rounds.” Over the course of the eight rounds that were completed
since the GATT came into effect among its original 23 signatories, the average tariff among Contracting
Parties has gone down from above 40% to less than 4%. See www.wto.org.

60

GATT art. III.
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See, e.g., Report of Panel, Japan Customs-Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and
Alcoholic Products (Nov. 10, 1987).
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international plane challenges to national policies ostensibly unrelated to trade that
disparately impacts foreign products.62 However, putting aside interpretive difficulties,
the national treatment component of the GATT is an indispensable element of any treaty
of integration that includes a tariff reduction scheme. Without a national treatment
discipline, a member state of such a treaty could impose discriminatory taxation or
regulation on foreign products so as to avoid its tariff obligations.63 In the panoply of
international measures to eliminate protectionism, national treatment is an indispensable
tool.
The third discipline prohibits the imposition of quantitative restrictions to trade
and their functional equivalents.64 The purpose of this discipline, and the interpretive
questions that it has generated, parallel the national treatment story. Here, too, the
founders of the GATT evidently sought to deprive states of a weapon of circumvention of
the tariff discipline. If State A cannot protect a sector of the economy by imposing a
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See, e.g., Report of Panel, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT DS-8-R (July 11, 1996). In this
case, the WTO rejected the argument of the United States to the effect that an aim and effect test should be
applied to root out protectionism when determining whether the national treatment provisions of the GATT
were violated. The literature and commentary on national treatment are of course voluminous and they lie
squarely beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that, even with an explicit mandate to root out
protectionism and to shelter national laws that furthers legitimate government purposes, national laws that
involved both protectionist and legitimate purposes might be challenged. In Reformulated Gasoline, for
example, the WTO was asked to evaluate the legality of a United States regulation, promulgated pursuant
to the Clean Air Act, which imposed more onerous requirements on foreign companies ostensibly on the
grounds that compliance with the substantive norm of the statute was difficult. While a protectionist
purpose might be inferred from the record, it is also evident that the United States’ interest in protecting its
environment were at stake. See Report of the Appellate Body, United States -- Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, (Apr. 26, 1996)
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Imagine, to illustrate this point, that State A agrees not to impose a tariff on State B’s cars in excess of
5%. If State A enacted a discriminatory sales tax, which burdens State B’s cars by say 10%, it would have
achieved a functionally equivalent economic result as a 10% tariff would accomplish. The difficult
questions of interpretation arise when, for example, the internal sales tax applies to cars that consume more
than a specified level of gasoline per mile, and State A’s sales tax disproportionately burden State B’s cars
because they tend to belong the category of products that is affected by the (ostensibly neutral) definition.
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GATT art. XI.
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tariff,65 it should not have the opportunity to do so by applying a quota to the imported
products:66 The interpretative problems associated with this GATT discipline relate of
course to what is a quota67 and also to the validity under international law of justifications
asserted by a state to defend what otherwise would amount to an illegal quantitative
restriction.68
The GATT, then, institutionalized on a multi-lateral level the classical economic
theories of Ricardo and Smith. The orthodox economic account of the GATT speaks of
redemption because it contrasts the GATT with the economic failures that preceded
World War II. While the story has nuances, its motif is that the main trading partners
failed to recognize that commerce should be based on comparative advantage and that
states should remove artificial barriers to trade. In characteristic fashion, the economists
wrote another chapter in the Book of Mistakes from the Inter-War Period. Not only did
Versailles oppress Germany instead of bringing it into Europe’s fold as a partner, but the
liberal democracies stubbornly insisted on rejecting a timeless notion of economic
organization. It was not enough for the democracies to fail strategically and allow
fascism to take over Germany; they also had to deprive themselves of economic unity and
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By way of example, if a 1000% tariff on foreign luxury cars would result in a drop in import from
1,000,000 cars to 1000 cars, a regulating state may achieve the same economic outcome by imposing a
1000 cars annual quota.

66

See, e.g.¸ GATT Dispute Panel Report on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, GATT B.I.S.D.
(31st Supp.) t 94 (May 15, 1984), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm.
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See, e.g., Report of the Panel, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
DS 10/R-37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990).
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See, e.g., Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998)[hereinafter Shrimp I].

23

strength by giving in to protectionist impulses at the very time when they needed to join
forces in the fight against fascism.69
Bretton Woods is the constitutional moment of this story in that it reflects the
understanding of the historical mistake made by the liberal democracies. Here as well,
the discourse often assumes an end of history. While the international legal order grew, it
remained essentially committed to its original mission.70 The Book of Mistakes had to be
rewritten into the Book of Redemption. Economic collapse caused by trade wars would
not only be unthinkable, but made impossible by a trading system that adopted
comparative advantage as its foundational value.71
To be sure, the end of economic history has its nuances and does not entirely stop
with the system put into place with GATT. The GATT does not merely establish three
disciplines intended to combat economic protectionism. Over time, the trade system
established intellectual property norms that protect the intangible assets of the enterprises
of Contracting Parties throughout the trading world.72 Rules on procurement, dumping,
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See, e.g., Paul R. Krugman, A Loss of (Theoretical) Nerve: The Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free
Trade, 83 Am.U.L.Rev. 62 (1993). See also JACQUES MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION (2001). See Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare, in
Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth: Papers in International Economics in Honor of Charles P.
Kindleberger 69 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al. eds., 1971); Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al., Domestic Distortions,
Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy, 71 J. Pol. Econ. 44 (1963); Harry G. Johnson, Optimal Trade
Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions, in Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments:
Essays in Honor of Gottfried Haberler (Richard E. Caves et al. eds., 1965); Peter J. Lloyd, A More General
Theory of Price Distortions in Open Economies, 4 J. Int'l Econ. 365 (1974).
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The parallel with the strategic story of the post-War period is striking. In his grand declaration of 1950,
Robert Schuman captured the strategic sentiment that spurred the unification of Europe when famously
declared that “a united Europe was not achieved and we had war.” Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950.
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See The Bretton Woods Project, Background to the Issues (stating that forty-three countries that met at
Bretton Woods conceived of the World Bank and IMF during World War II to help rebuild Europe in postwar reconstruction efforts), available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/background/index.shtml (last
visited Sept. 23, 2003).
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TRIPs established minimum levels of protection regarding patents, copyright and trademarks that the
Contracting Parties must transpose into domestic law. The rationale for TRIPs is that opening up barriers
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subsidies, technical barriers to trade, and sanitary measures were adopted.73 The WTO
established a system of judicial remedies which, albeit State to State, produces decisions
and reasoned opinions that are reminiscent of the domestic systems of justice in liberal
democracies.74 The Doha Round of negotiations could well take an historical step in
eliminating subsidies and other protective measure related to agricultural products,
thereby denting systems of protection of farmers that have deep historical and political
roots in Europe and other industrialized areas.75

to trade would give undertakings in countries with lesser intellectual property protection access to products
protected in other jurisdictions. Without intellectual property protection in the importing jurisdiction, these
undertakings could lawfully infringe on rights that are protected in the foreign jurisdiction. Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement]; Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis 144-47 (2d ed. 2003).
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Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1140
(1994) [hereinafter SPM Agreement]; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1140
(1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement]; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—
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Agreement]; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL
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See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm. See also Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo,
Judicial Independence in International Tribunals Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL.
L. REV. 1.
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The Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration of 2001 provides in pertinent parts:

“1. The multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade Organization has contributed
significantly to economic growth, development and employment throughout the past fifty years. We are
determined, particularly in the light of the global economic slowdown, to maintain the process of reform
and liberalization of trade policies, thus ensuring that the system plays its full part in promoting recovery,
growth and development.
…
2. International trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic development and the alleviation
of poverty. We recognize the need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and
welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority of WTO members are developing
countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this
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However, these were all new chapters within the end of history paradigm. Doha
may bring in more access for developing countries’ produce.76 The WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Body, even if it evolved into a system of access for individuals over the next
generations, seeks at its core to eliminate the Contracting Parties’ ability to selectively
exit their substantive obligations.77 Its jurisprudence in such seminal cases as
Shrimp/Turtle or Reformulated Gasoline address the conflict between trade liberalization
and countervailing domestic policies.78 Intellectual property or technical barriers to trade
rules begin the process of harmonization that, as the European experience illustrates, goes
hand in hand with market access.79 Anti-dumping regulates such market access by

Declaration. Recalling the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement, we shall continue to make positive
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure
a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. In this
context, enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well targeted, sustainably financed technical
assistance and capacity-building programmes have important roles to play.
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Approach?, 27 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 371 (2004).
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Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403 (1991). While the concept is multifaceted, and Professor
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precluding trade practices that are deemed unfair and anti-competitive.80 When Bretton
Woods ushered in a trade liberalization framework, it set in motion a historical course
that was bound to generate the issues that these international regulatory frameworks
address, and that future rules will continue to address. However, as we describe below,
while Bretton Woods surely has retained enormous relevance, the transformative shifts
that it has generated require a new constitutional moment.
Before we reach the new constitutional moment, however, we must continue to
tell the story of Bretton Woods. The economist has now finished its discourse, and in
come the lawyer and the theoretician of the State. As Keynes wrote, the lawyers were the
“poets of Bretton Woods.” In order to understand our theory, we must now explain the
contours of their poetry.81
B. Bretton Woods and the State.
All serious students of trade have learned that the economic ideology of trade
provides only a partial, and perhaps even junior, account of the original intent of the
framers of the GATT and the reasons for its general acceptance by the Contracting
Parties. In order to understand the GATT, one has to look at internal foundational
frameworks of the major players that brought about its formation after World War II.82
These constitutional rules83 help explain why the major economic powers that formed the
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See Anti-Dumping Code, (Agreement on Implementation of the GATT Article IV),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#fAgreement.
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See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the
Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State, in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 50 (Robert Howse ed., 1988), reprinted in JOHN
GERARD RUGGIE, MULTILATERALISM MATTERS 125 (1993).
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GATT chose the legal structure that it embodied, and why they mustered the political
willingness to accept the trade disciplines that the treaty imposed on them. This account
complements the economic story. It essentially holds that the internal configuration of
the states that formed the GATT had to work in harmony with the international system
that they put in place. States did not simply have an economic epiphany. They chose
GATT because they could maintain their domestic architecture, all the while entering into
an international framework that allowed them to expand the global economic pie.
While this account goes deeper than the economic tale, again it has an end of
history flavor. The story assumes that the State reached its apex when it organized itself
along modern liberal democratic lines and established an internal constitutional
framework for redistributing resources. It starts with the constitutional rules that were
fundamental to modern liberal democracies after World War II. These included broad
legal and policy schemes that embodied a given state’s wealth choices as to redistributive
justice and the relationship between various economic segments of society. Indeed, the
internal system of all major GATT players rested on the redistribution of wealth and
control of the domestic economy through interventionist, welfare policies. This is best
explained in broad strokes. In Europe, these policies would take the shape of public
enterprise, unemployment compensation, housing aid, help to large families, and other
policies intended to transfer wealth from high income segments of society to lower
income workers and to protect discrete classes deemed to be disadvantaged in the market.
In the United States, the emphasis was more exclusively on tax and transfer policies.
Japan, for its part, relied heavily on centralized planning of industrial activity and
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subsidies of research and development that would shore up enterprises that housed a large
part of the domestic workforce.84
Despite their different viewpoints regarding, all major players shared a basic
philosophy of domestic statecraft that went hand-in-hand with liberalized trade.85
Liberalized trade worked not only because comparative advantage was the right
foundational principle for international commerce. Rather, Bretton Woods also allowed
the Contracting Parties to marry international economic policies and an international
order of states that tended to maximize wealth creation with a legal framework that
protected their ability to control the domestic economy. The negative covenants of the
GATT, as originally structured, left the Contracting Parties free to utilize interventionist
domestic policies. It is of course true that trade liberalization conflicted with domestic
policies in many instances, and that many battles have been waged on this front. The
system, though, was designed for the State to have the means to repel trade
liberalization.86
Simplistically put, it allowed for a maximization of the global output and
economic pie available for redistribution to each nation-state. The tariffs, national
treatment and quotas rule did not, as originally framed and implemented, supplant
domestic rules on redistributive justice. France, for example, could extend housing aid to
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disadvantaged workers, provide for workforce-protective labor rules, maintain a
nationalized health system, keep a government stake in major enterprises, or pay grants
upon the birth of a third child, without any interference from the international trade
rules.87 Japan’s Ministry of Trade and Industry could continue its indicative planning,
and the United States could freely tax and spend, without running afoul or being hindered
by the international system.88 While the international system contained domestic
protectionist urges of the type that produced the “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that
preceded World War II, it married itself well with the economic ethos of the modern
liberal democracies.89
The harmonious functioning of domestic constitutional rules and international law
came hand in hand with historical tendencies that made comparative advantage a better
foundational norm for the international trading system than the domestically driven,
mercantilist policies that preceded World War II. These policies, embodied in statutes
such as the Smoot Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,90 were clearly thought by the GATT
founders to have contributed to the economic disasters of the 1930s and to the advent of
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fascism as a contender for control of statecraft.91 By binding the liberal democracies to a
set of rules that would not only make such disasters legally impossible but would also not
threaten their perception of economic sovereignty, the GATT created a world trade
system that accorded with internal law and politics.92
Economic prose and legal poetry, then, created a system that many observers
analyze with static, end of history lenses. Much ink has been shed on how to improve it,
but most of the critiques operate within the confines of the Bretton Woods constitutional
moment in that they accept the State as understood at Bretton Woods as the domestic
participant in the order of states. Consider the prime topics of contention in today’s trade
world: The battle waged at the border of trade liberalization and conflicting domestic
policies assumes a sovereign State to which the order of states leaves the prerogative to
regulate its territory and to redistribute resources. Whether or not the United States can
legally exclude shrimp caught at the expense of sea turtles or France can legally ban the
import of asbestos, the stakes relate to the precise location of the border between
domestic and international forces.93 The developing countries’ plight, which pervades
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the Doha Round, is couched principally in terms of market access and the end of
hypocrisy.94 If Doha had a slogan, it would be that its participants should let Bretton
Woods ring throughout the world. At the end of the day, the trading world is still
engaged in the concretization of a constitutional moment that, as we describe later, has
not run its course yet, but is in need of a fresh look in light of the transformative shifts
that it has brought about.
C. The State and the Order of States.
Our theory posits that the relationship between the domestic constitutional realm
and the international trade order of states goes well beyond the marriage of a good
economic idea with a legal system that makes its acceptance politically palatable. We
depart from the notion that Bretton Woods, joining comparative advantage with a theory
of the State as having reached its highest expression in the form of the modern liberal
democracy, ended the trade history. Rather, we submit that Bretton Woods ushered in a
constitutional moment that acknowledged both the then current evolutionary stage of the
State and the new order of states that Statecraft metamorphosis had generated.
Our starting point coincides with the analysis of Bretton Woods as a joint political
and economic enterprise in that we agree that the Keynesian welfare state was
particularly well suited for the GATT framework and its introduction of comparative
advantage and anti-protectionist rules. Keynes was right to call the lawyers, and the
political theory that they wrote into the Treaty, the “poets of Bretton Woods.”95 The
GATT, as explained above, sheltered welfare policies and left constituent states free to
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act as experimental laboratories on how best to improve their people’s welfare. In
addition, it created sufficient ambiguity in the system to permit States to “exit
selectively” the tenets of free trade based on domestic welfare requirements.96 All in all,
it is true that the GATT established a framework that insulated domestic politics and
redistributive justice choices from international intervention, and to that extent it
accorded with the ethos of the welfare state.
However, in our account, Bretton Woods came, and (as explained below) it came
too late, to crystallize in a constitutional moment transformations that had previously
taken place and to take one more constitutional snapshot in the story of human
organizational evolution. Recognizing it as such mandates inquiry into what the next
constitutional stage should be, and when the rite of passage that will be necessary to set it
in motion should be held. That is our task in Part III. For the moment, let us explain
Bretton Woods that was (and the Bretton Woods that should have come earlier) through
our lens.
As discussed in Part I, the State may be understood as a constant entity that
undergoes successive constitutional cycles. During each cycle, the State follows
relatively stable constitutional features, on both domestic and international planes. At the
same time, often as a result of the operation of these constitutional features, new realities
arise to confront states and force them to adjust their fundamental constitutional elements
and gradually usher in yet another cycle. Again, the end of history observation, whether
made by Hegel or Fukuyama, does not sound in a messianic era of Kantian “perpetual
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peace”97 nor an end to the evolution of Statecraft. Those voices, however, keenly reflect
a sentiment of transformation, widely felt, that should prompt an inquiry as to whether a
new constitutional cycle may be at hand.
The State that Bretton Woods faced arose from a period of solidification of the
“nation” as its basis. At least in Europe, the respective nations who stood behind the 20th
century states had been formed by coming together under a State that strived to amass
resources and chose to fight wars in furtherance of their own solidification goals.98 On
the international scene, the complex colonizing enterprise had strong commercial
motivations and by all accounts generated substantial economic benefits to the
colonizers.99 This influenced the respective political and economic powers of the nationstates that dominated the international scenes, in particular the European states. At the
same time, domestically, the process of building the nation generated a population
comprised of various segments, including large working classes, a bourgeoisie and upper
classes or nobility, who were collectively affiliated with a single state.100 They came to
form a nation with which the State now had to contend.
The focal point of our inquiry is not the organizational nature of the State as a
modern liberal democracy, but rather the solidification process that it experienced, the
attendant birth of a nation as its support, and the evolution in Statecraft that arose out of
97
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those phenomena. It is against this Statecraft background that the competing theories of
Marxism, fascism and modern liberal democracy would oppose one another for control of
the State. All models spoke to the nation, the new “sovereign,” that had come to form
the basis of the State. Under the scenarios envisaged by all models, whether a triumph of
the workers, an eternal Reich, or a Fukuyama ending, Statecraft history would in fact run
out its course and end with a particular form of organization in relation to the nation.101
In the Marxist vision, the workers would achieve perpetual control of the State through a
final class warfare. The fascist regime would conquer and rule forever. Modern liberal
democracies would establish regimes that, in various shapes and forms, featured several
of the fundamental hallmarks of democracy identified by Fukuyama and many others. In
all cases, the nation was the basis of the State, and the welfare of the nation its
legitimating drive, a common objective to be achieved though different routes. Without
this evolution of Statecraft, the competing ideologies would not have had any territory to
conquer.102
The significance of the nature of Statecraft for Bretton Woods lies in the natural
harmony between Statecraft in a nation-State and comparative advantage. We agree with
scholars such as Ruggie that from a political standpoint, Bretton Woods worked well for
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modern liberal democracies.103 We agree with Keynes that, without the delicate poetry of
Bretton Woods, the modern liberal democracies might not have accepted the GATT as
they did.104 We accept the economists’ account of comparative advantage as a better
norm for the trading world in the 20th century than mercantilism.105 However, our story
is about Statecraft, as a set of ideas and concepts and as the concrete manifestation of
those ideas in the domestic and international realms, and in the ladder that links them.
We submit that, in the realm of pure ideas and their manifestation in the economic reality
of the states, the modern liberal democracies had, by 1917, sufficient evidence of the
need for a trade constitutional moment to hold Bretton Woods then, in lieu of the Treaty
of Versailles, but only as the next stage of the evolution of Statecraft and the order of
states.
By then the nation-state, and the internal economic order that it had generated,
resulted in an industrialized world subdivided into discrete national economies, a nation
owning virtually all means of production within the territory governed by each nationstate, the welfare of the nation as the legitimating drive of the State, and states having (as
a result of these phenomena) the means and the incentive to regulate and control the
domestic realm.106 The very elements that changed the nature of Statecraft, from a State
supported by then nation to a State harnessing itself to the nation, were reflected in the
103

See JOHN G. RUGGIE, Embedded Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Regimes, in
CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLICY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALIZATION (1998);
104

See Howse, supra note 81.

105

See, e.g., Paul R. Krugman, A Loss of (Theoretical) Nerve: The Narrow and Broad Arguments for
Free Trade, 83 Am.U.L.Rev. 62 (1993). See also JACQUES MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2001).
106

See Hart, supra note [50].

36

domestic reality.107 Unlike today,108 the main assets of each state lay in the hands of the
nation. Industrial, agricultural and other output could be characterized, on a consistent
basis, with the nation. The trading world could be subdivided into blocs, each of which
was comprised of an aggregate of goods, capital, assets, currency and other resources that
in a real sense belonged to the nation. The presence of these resources enabled the State
to maintain a substantial degree of control over the nation, and to implement welfare
policies of the type acknowledged by Bretton Woods. These were the concrete
manifestations of Statecraft as a set of ideas. Given these circumstances, and the ideas
upon which they rested, the foundational norms of the trade order of states had to change.
The interwoven and dynamic architecture of Statecraft and the order of states had
generated a clearing for a new constitutional moment by 1917. The solidification period
that preceded the Bretton Woods world was marked by relatively mercantilist and inward
oriented policies that made good sense at the time.109 Inward looking policies, whether
on an international or a domestic realm, created a nation-State architecture. This
architecture made the very order of states that generated it obsolete and created a need for
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a new constitutional moment. Bretton Woods became necessary, not because it was the
height of human organizational evolution, but because a new stage, born out of the
metamorphoses of the prior era, had arrived. Alas, Bretton Woods ushered in the
constitutional moment, but too late, and only for the next stage of history.110
An understanding of the state of Statecraft in 1917 would have enabled the
trading states to grasp the constitutional moment of Bretton Woods closer to the time
when it became ripe. By then, it made sense to shake off completely the lingering habit
of following mercantilist policies that, in light of the advent of a collectivity of nationstates divided along economic lines coextensive with the nation, had become increasingly
obsolete. Before World War I, it was not necessarily unreasonable for states to engage in
a self-interested trade policy. To be sure, mercantilist policies may be explained by
various other theories, such as the capture of politicians by narrow economic interests
that do not maximize the welfare of the nation. True, mercantilist policies were tempered
by various treaties and arrangements that were based on free trade concepts, and
commercial actors from various states of course conducted business together. However,
the collectivity of states was not ready before 1917 to institutionalize the principle of
comparative advantage and generally open up borders to trade because neither the
process of internal solidification nor the outward quest for resources accorded with
policies of liberalization of international commerce. When these very processes yielded
modern liberal democratic states dedicated to enhancing the welfare of a “nation” that
had matured in the course of supporting the state and that had control over were
essentially national industries and means of production, it made sense for these states to
110

See Jean Monnet Program Materials, The Grammar and Syntax of Trade, Unit I,
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/wto/PDF-files/WTO_2004_UnitI.pdf (quoting WTO arguments that
peace is a function of trade cooperation and dispute resolution).

38

shift the international trade components of their Statecraft to incorporate the tenets of
Smith and Ricardo.
In other words, in the inter-War period, when both fascism and communism were
still viable alternatives, states that affiliated themselves with modern liberal democratic
ideals faced a transformed domestic landscape that made a change from mercantilistoriented policies to policies such as those effected by Bretton Woods both possible and
desirable. A relatively substantial middle class, and a working class whose condition was
steadily improving, formed the core of the nation. The State was shifting in its quest for
legitimacy from harnessing the nation to solidify itself to harnessing itself to provide for
the nation’s welfare. The world of modern liberal democracies came to be divided into
units of economic activity coextensive with these nations. The State had control over
internal matters related to the welfare of the nation. To accept comparative advantage as
a trade generating principle, within a system where domestic control was needed and
feasible, was the logical order of states given the state of Statecraft. In hindsight, it is
clear that the demise of the mercantilist system that occurred at Bretton Woods, and that
was further effectuated through the Marshall Plan and the gradual rise of European
Community, should have occurred at the end of World War I, together with (or better yet
instead of) the Versailles Treaty. If it did not, it was in part because of a lingering habit
of following a model that evolved in an era that featured Statecraft principles that had
become obsolete, and the failure to step out of that habit to look at Statecraft and its
relationship with the order of states.
The last pieces of the Statecraft puzzle lie in the concept of balance of powers and
in the connection between strategy, war and the trade order of states. The modern world
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that Cooper describes includes balance of powers as an essential feature.111 A multipolar
world of solidified nation-states rests on a balance of powers among its constituent
entities. In the trade world, this phenomenon is also replicated, and here again the
Bretton Woods moment may be understood as recognizing, albeit too late, that
phenomenon. Bretton Woods joined the theory of comparative advantage with
substantial cross-Atlantic investment into sovereign, and democratic, blocs in Western
Europe (and Japan) as part of the Marshall Plan. The new trade system respected borders
and sovereignty, and it allowed states to advance national welfare through internal
policies. The Marshall Plan’s infusion of capital into Europe created trading partners
whose economic strengths would enable them to maintain the requisite balance of
powers.112 In other words, the Bretton Woods/Marshall Plan system was comprised of
trading “nations,” organized as states, who had economic powers sufficient to check one
another and who would remove barriers to trade while respecting one another’s national
sovereignty.
The commercial system put in place at Bretton Woods also accorded with the
strategic and political needs of the World War II victors. We are unlikely to ever know
whether fascism might have been defeated earlier if Bretton Woods and the Marshall
Plan had been adopted instead of Versailles. Whether Schuman was right when he
famously declared that binding the European warriors to a partnership would be the only
way to peace, or whether Cooper is right that fascism had to die a natural death as an idea
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before democracy would prevail,113 we will never know. The point, though, is that the
failure of the world trade system to identify early the need to rethink its foundational
principles, and the direction of trade, did not give trade a chance to further peace.
This was the commercial framework that prevailed from the First World War until
the defeat of communism. Far from being the “end of history,” however, the modern
liberal democracies’ triumph has simply ushered in a new era of struggle. History seems
to have a habit of giving mortals a brief respite between crises. The “roaring twenties”
preceded the advent of fascism and Hitler’s rise to power.114 The “optimistic nineties,”
marked by a relative era of peace, prosperity, and the illusory faith that globalization
could promote worldwide democracy and economic growth, are clearly being followed
by another dark era, marked not by initial public offerings and young globetrotting
idealists, but by deeply pernicious and diffuse threats. The parallel is striking. Now, as
then, Statecraft faces a transformed landscape and moving forces, which demand a
reevaluation of trade policy and an adjustment of the international commercial order of
States for a new era.
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III: Trade and the Needs of the 21st Century
Part II posits that the Bretton Woods order of states arose out of the evolution of
Statecraft within the collectivity of nation-states that entered into the Treaty. At its core,
the structural system that Bretton Woods put in place relied on the rejection of
protectionism. Removing barriers to trade would enable specialization in products
where each nation has a comparative advantage. The institutionalization of comparative
advantage would increase the global pie. In the domestic realm, trade restrictions would
no longer be used as a means of achieving a wealth transfer objective. This accorded
with principles of good governance in that international rules would prevent national
governments from caving in to protectionist domestic pressures, thereby compelling
states to follow the system that best served the welfare of the nation. As Ruggie noted,
the system also worked in harmony with liberal democratic political organization because
the constituent states could maintain domestic organization all the while entering into a
treaty that would increase the resources available to foster that organization.115
We submit that the GATT theoretical framework was a time-bound function of
Statecraft in the generation of the nation-state: The State harnessed itself to the nation.
Its legitimating drive focused on the improvement of the nation’s welfare, which
expressed itself through wealth redistribution and other policies that varied from state to
state.116 Comparative advantage, as expressed through a trade-liberalizing order of states,
complemented domestic control over these policies in that it generated additional
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resources for redistribution regardless of the exact contours of the domestic system that
was put in place.117 Put otherwise, Bretton Woods established a modern order of states
consistent with the solidified State that lies at the core of modern Statecraft. However,
Bretton Woods did not signal the end of trade history. Rather, it belatedly ushered in a
trade order of states that set in motion interconnected transformative movements that
were bound to ultimately usher in a new constitutional period. Our claim is that the time
has come for a new constitutional moment to usher in that period.
In this Part III, we proceed in three steps. First, we explain the successive
generations of trade issues that the GATT (and later the WTO) faced, through the lens of
modern Statecraft and the order of states. Next, we argue that the Bretton Woods trade
system was bound to generate a transformation of Statecraft from modern to post-modern
which, over time, would result in the erosion of comparative advantage as the
foundational norm of the system and require a new constitutional norm and moment. Our
claim here is that Bretton Woods, which was born out of the solidification of the State,
generated an international order that (ironically) was bound in time to weaken the State
and necessitate a passage to a new constitutional era. We then identify the “enablement
of global economic opportunity” as the new foundational norm for the system, to be
superimposed on comparative advantage in overhauled substantive and institutional
frameworks that a new constitutional moment should usher in.
The upshot of our argument is also three-fold: (i) first, history never ends, and
the interdependent mechanics of Statecraft and the order of states will, in each
generation, usher in the need for revising the international commercial order and have a
117
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new constitutional moment; (ii) second, theoreticians and planners of trade can predict
not only the issues that a trade system will generate at any moment in history, but also
decipher and anticipate the contours of the next generation, if they understand the
mechanics of Statecraft and the order of states. (ii) third, each constitutional moment is
bound to set in motion transformative mechanisms that essentially plant the seeds of the
succeeding generation, and the time has come for a new constitutional moment of trade.
A. The Bretton Woods World.
Bretton Woods inherited and shaped a world subdivided into national economies
coextensive with the nation-states that established the trade order of GATT. The
theoretical foundation of the system respected sovereignty, left it to internal domestic
policy to control the redistribution of wealth, and removed trade restrictions as
protectionist tools from the panoply of government interventionist policies. Fiscal policy,
monetary control, welfare enhancing mechanisms and other means of domestic control
over redistributive justice were, at least in theory, left untouched. The solidified states
that comprised the system had the ability to control and manage their economies. They
acted on the international scene as the agents of their national industries, and the primary
interlocutors of trade. They gave their national industries access to new markets,
controlled foreign producers’ access to domestic markets, lowered prices for their
consumers, and operated in a system that allowed them to promote the welfare of the
nation and achieve their legitimating drive.118
Looking at the Bretton Woods order of states after World War II through the lens
of Statecraft in the nation-state, a theoretician of trade could have articulated the principal
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legal and structural issues that would face the system over the next decades. The
principal elements of Statecraft were welfare, the nation, and sovereignty.119 Each was
tested, predictably, by the GATT order of states. Trade 101 teaches that the removal of
barriers to cross border flow of goods and services causes friction among the domestic
policies of the constituent states.120 The friction stems from the disparity in regulatory
environment that obtain within those states. It is not possible to import a product
without, to some extent, importing the regulatory environment in which it was made. A
Korean automobile worker may make one-tenth of the income that a Detroit worker
would have earned for a similar product. He or she may work in a factory where
occupational safety standards lag far behind those of the United States and Michigan.
When an American dealer imports cars manufactured under these conditions, they
essentially dilute the United States labor and occupational safety legislation to the extent
of the market share of the Korean automobile industry.
The important trade cases that the GATT and its WTO successor faced reflect the
friction between the economic control policies of the nation-states. Scholars often use the
vague prism of “sovereignty” to capture the battles that have taken place.121 Trade may
erode sovereignty, the analysis goes, because it thrusts in the name of economic laissez
faire and liberalism laxer regulatory standards onto the domestic sphere. Trade rules, for
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example, may be invoked to attempt to compel France to accept asbestos products
lawfully marketed in Canada or higher hormone content in meat products that comply
with United States standards.122 It may deprive the United States of the tools to protect
sea turtles and dolphins against unconcerned fishing undertakings.123 It may prevent
Japan from protecting a disfavored minority that specializes in leather products that the
rest of the world can manufacture more cheaply.124 It will cause Western workers to lose
jobs to countries where protection of labor runs low on the scale of priorities.125
We submit that these issues are not “absolute” issues facing the trade world, but
they had significance principally because they arose in a trading system where Statecraft
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was defined by welfare, sovereignty and the nation. To illustrate our point, let us start
with a far-fetched hypothetical. Imagine a world where the main elements of Statecraft
relate to the State’s ability to protect its subjects against physical harm, and where there is
no regulation of economic life.126 Assume that, as in the 20th century, each state had
industries that are essentially national in nature, but that fostering the welfare of the
nation was not a legitimating drive of states. Nonetheless, through market forces, certain
states achieved a voluntary level of labor, environmental, health and safety protection that
matches that of the Western nation-states of the 20th century. In other states, no such
welfare standards apply. If the GATT operated in such a world, there would be no need
for states to address the tension among regulatory environments, because (put simply)
there would be no regulatory environments. While discrete industries may change their
practices in response to market forces, or ask for protectionist measures to shelter their
voluntary practices, the states would not have a vital interest in combating lesser
standards because the welfare of the nation would not be part of their legitimating drive.
In the GATT modern world, however, the State’s promotion of welfare is an essential
element of Statecraft and the tension, between States rather than between domestic
policies and trade, is bound to arise.
The entire GATT and WTO framework, and the interpretive issues and dispute
resolution institutions that they spawned, can be explained by looking at it through this
prism. In the cases that dominate the trade literature, domestic policies from the state’s
panoply of nation-welfare promotion come under challenge. These policies include
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labor, health, consumer, environmental and conservation regulatory frameworks.127 In all
instances, the states vied to lose as little control as possible over their ability to enhance
legitimacy through the relevant policies. The hermeneutics of the GATT and WTO
decisions focused heavily on the need to shelter sovereignty, and on deciphering a
justification for infringing on the aspects of Statecraft that are essential to the nationstate. The battle took place on a state-to-state level, because allowing private party
access would, as was the case in Europe, would unsettle Statecraft. The common
denominator of the cases was their focus on the extent to which a state may reject another
state’s policies by denying import of a product manufactured or marketed in violation of
rules of the importing state that are essential to Statecraft in the nation-state.128
In other words, the essential elements of Statecraft in the modern world drove the
main interpretive issues of the GATT/WTO. Bretton Woods took on a world divided into
127
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national, discrete economic blocs. Its interpretation, put simply, focused on how best to
protect the regulatory borders of these blocs.
In addition, the institutional and dispute resolution structure of the GATT/WTO
also arose out of Statecraft in the modern world. Unlike Europe, the GATT/WTO
established a State-to-State system of dispute resolution. Until the establishment of the
Dispute Settlement Body, defending states had the option to reject adverse decisions.129
Even after this rule was reversed, and a system of trade tribunals with the hallmarks of
Western courts was established, states were substantially sheltered from challenges by the
natural tendencies of governments to use limited legal resources sparingly and to avoid
legal challenges to other states out of concern that their own non-compliance might be
attacked in retaliation.130 The upshot of the system was to give its members a substantial
ability to “selectively exit” its tenets.131 Sovereignty, understood as the ability to
maintain control over policies intended to foster the welfare of the nations, could be
protected to a much larger extent than in a system of judicial remedies such as that of the
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European Union, where individuals have the virtually unfettered ability to enforce the
trade norms against domestic rules.132

B. Jacob’s Ladder Revisited: The Metamorphosis of the Bretton Woods World.
The Bretton Woods order, in conjunction with other factors, generated
foundational shifts in domestic Statecraft and a transformed international economic
landscape. We posit that the Bretton Woods world has so fundamentally changed that a
new constitutional moment is now at hand. In this subpart, we outline the
metamorphoses that we believe are ushering in the new constitutional era. In the next
subpart, we will delineate the contours of this era, and the foundational norms and
institutional framework that should be put in place.
The world can no longer be viewed as a subdivision of national economies
coextensive with the nation-states shored up by national middle classes and other
segments of the population that own means of production that are essentially national in
nature. The GATT/WTO opened up borders to trade in goods and services. The
constitutional moment of Bretton Woods can be captured by the concept of openness that
comparative lies at the root of comparative advantage. The very language of trade, which
relies on fundamental notions such as “market access,” “cross border flow of goods,” or
“removal of barriers,” reflects the establishment of an international system where discrete
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markets will tend to integrate into a global marketplace. In that marketplace, goods will
be freely exchanged, by consumers as well as producers.
The national nature of the means of production is bound to erode as a result of an
order such as that installed by Bretton Woods. Domestic producers will elect to purchase
components necessary for their output, or simply products for domestic resale, from
jurisdictions that have a comparative advantage. That cross border import is the
archetypal activity that Bretton Woods contemplates. The story, however, will not end
there. Domestic manufacturers will in all likelihood seek to acquire equity or other
stakes in the enterprises from which they buy, so as to increase their profit margins.
Conversely, sellers will seek to participate in the profits of the companies that import
their products. Further, the Bretton Woods world was bound (as it did) to increase the
incidence of joint ventures and other cross border partnerships.133 The openness and
sheer magnitude of the markets, and the increased competition that liberalized trade
generates, makes such enterprises an inevitable part of commercial life.
The overlapping of ownership and the spread of production has made it
increasingly difficult to identify a particular product as belonging to one nation versus
another. A handbag manufactured in China, designed in Italy, bearing a French Brand,
and marked as “Made in Italy” is not a product of any particular country, whatever rules
of origin might have to say about its classification for tariff purposes. DaimlerChrysler
manufactures cars that traditionally were viewed as quintessentially German (such as
Mercedes Benz) and American (such as Jeep). The company entered into a strategic
alliance with Mitsubishi Motors and as a result it also markets brands that have been
133
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associated with Asia.134 Its one billion shares, it goes without saying, are owned by
investors from all continents. The phenomenon obtains even on a small scale: New
York’s Garment District has shifted its production en masse from Brooklyn to the Far
East. These U.S. garment manufacturers began the shift by shipping materials for
fabrication, and later they came to acquire factories or enter into strategic alliances with
their producers. Conversely, the Far East manufacturers have increasingly acquired
stakes in their clients.
This transformation of economic activity was compounded by the revolution in
global communications that the trading world experienced. The steel mill, textiles plant,
or agricultural field of the 20th century have now been replaced by a computer
workstation that can be run from virtually anywhere in the world. Microchips can be
manufactured in Silicon Valley from computer software including codes written in India
that, in the aggregate, can be compared to a factory in their complexity.135 Transcription
services can be outsourced via access service provider software to the Philippines.136 An
American appellate brief can be researched and written in Jamaica, and filed by a
licensed attorney in Camden, New Jersey. Increased trade and competition were bound
to generate innovation, and the communications breakthroughs that came about furthered
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the establishment of a global marketplace where the phenomenon of discrete national
economies has eroded.
In the course of the metamorphosis of the Bretton Woods world, the State lost
control over fundamental tools of wealth transfer and protection of the domestic economy
that the Bretton Woods order contemplated would stay within the domestic Statecraft
realm. Monetary policy, for example, is increasingly escaping control by states. The
sheer magnitude of markets for currencies is gradually resulting in the transformation of
money from a tool of exchange, which can be manipulated domestically, to a mere
commodity.137 Public debt is increasingly being held by foreign actors, and is being
regulated more by the interplay of commercial interests than by domestic choices. A
simplified and simplistic example is the relationship between the United States and
Japan. The United States has for a long time been a main purchaser of Japanese goods,
and Japan a main purchaser of U.S. debt. While of course the United States has a
continuing ability to self-finance its debt, over time this phenomenon may extend to new
actors on the international scene, including prominently China, with a resulting decrease
in domestic control.138
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This loss of control, which arises out of the impact of the trade order of states on
the domestic realm, undermines states’ ability to provide for the welfare of the nation in
the same manner as they did in the 20th century. At the same time, as described in Part I,
the states’ ability to muster domestic resources to sustain their welfare on a domestic
level is being challenged. The upshot is that the welfare of the nation is fading away as
an essential component of Statecraft and legitimating drive of states. This pillar of the
Bretton Woods world is becoming a secondary policy objective, which is bound to
gradually fade away as the 21st century advances.
Concurrent with this phenomenon, sovereignty and balance of powers are also
being eroded. As a result of the global marketplace that Bretton Woods has wrought, the
21st century has inherited a multipolar economic world resting on a global middle class
spread across the North and the South. Brazil, India, China, and South Korea, to cite a
few, have increasingly become world economic centers. The output of the non-OECD
countries has reached 45% today, and is expected to reach 60% by 2015.139 The old
Second World, made up of communist countries, is being replaced by a new Second
World comprised of economies formerly classified under the global heading of
“developing countries.” Lying within and alongside the first (post-modern) and second
(modern) economies are pre-modern collectivities of people that lack the education,
infrastructure and other conditions to benefit from the liberalization of trade that the
WTO has brought about. These may live in Brazilian shantytowns, in Afghan mountains
or in the “excluded” neighborhoods that surround Paris. The bottom line, though, is that
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the main interlocutors of trade are no longer national middle classes represented by their
states; rather the trading world is comprised of a diffuse middle class, spread out in a
multipolar economic configuration, that economists estimate to amount to a collectivity
of 800 million people surrounded by those who not become meaningful participants in
the global marketplace.140
The metamorphosis of Bretton Woods means that the world trade system’s
conceptual tool for understanding itself (an aggregation of nation-states governed by the
sovereignty, welfare and balance of powers principles of the 20th century) is eroding.
The erosion of the nation-state and the nation’s welfare as the legitimating drive for the
State, the gradual decline of the model of a world subdivided into national economies,
and the transformation of the means of productions, mean that comparative advantage
can no longer be the sole animating norm of the world’s trading system. Our thesis is
that a new constitutional moment is needed to usher in a trade norm that and institutions
that will supplement Bretton Woods. In the next subpart, we outline the contours of this
norm, which we describe as the “enablement of global economic opportunity” and of the
institutions that will need to be put in place to implement it.
C. The Enablement of Global Economic Opportunity.
i. The Norm.
The enablement of global economic opportunity is a norm that would accord with
a diffuse marketplace that has moved away from a world comprised of discrete economic
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units coextensive with a nation whose welfare the State is dedicated to promote. Our
starting point, as with Bretton Woods, is with domestic Statecraft. The modern nationstates, we have argued in Part I, are being replaced by a collectivity of post-modern
states. Whether they are called “market-states”, “post-modern”, or other label, the
important substantive component of Statecraft within those states is the replacement of
the welfare of the nation with the pushing and prodding of economic activity as the
legitimating drive of the State. Sovereignty and balance of powers also fade away in the
world of post-modern states, owing to the diffuseness that characterizes the global
marketplace.141
We submit that instead of managing welfare, the nation, sovereignty and balance
of powers, post-modern states will increasingly need to manage diffuseness, foster
economic opportunity, preserve their middle class, and prod their markets to achieve the
gradual extension of the middle class and its economic opportunities to the pre-modern
collectivities. In turn, just like Bretton Woods established a trade order that accorded
with the components of Statecraft of the modern states, a new constitutional era should
usher in a trade order that accord with these transformed elements of Statecraft in the
post-modern world. The trade order of states should establish rules, to be superimposed
on Bretton Woods, which embody the enablement of global economic opportunity, in a
constitutional rite of passage.
In many ways, economic opportunity is a logical extension of welfare promotion.
The solidification of the nation in the state-nation evolutionary stage brought about the
nation-state. The State’s legitimating drive became the promotion of the welfare of the
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nation, in a world where sovereign economic units coexisted within a balance of powers
paradigm. That world brought about an explosion of economic units into a diffuse whole,
and a resulting weakening of states. Given the erosion of welfare and of the nation, the
State’s legitimating drive should logically move on to fostering economic opportunity
and managing diffuseness. Unable to foster welfare, deprived of the nation as the object
of its welfare effort, the State fell back on economic opportunity as its next best
alternative.
Before we move on to describe the constitutional moment that we advocate, we
shall explain how the conceptual shift to economic opportunity explains some of the
current pressures and trends in the Doha negotiations. The enablement of global
economic opportunity norm can be deciphered in Doha agenda under the heading of
market access. The Doha agenda is dominated by issues often described as related to
“developing countries.”142 These issues include, among other things, the removal of
“selective exit” for products such as agricultural goods with respect to which certain
developing countries have a comparative advantage. To a certain extent, the enablement
of global economic opportunity is a function of completing the Bretton Woods enterprise,
and Doha can be understood as following the tide of history.
The completion of the Bretton Woods enterprise will necessitate some
institutional overhaul that will go beyond the matters on the Doha agenda. The multipolarity and diffuseness of the new world are bound to create new protectionist pressures
on domestic governments, which the institutional tools of the WTO are not equipped to
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deal with adequately. The flow of industry to the multi-polar world is bound to affect
industries that are sensitive to the economies of the United States, Europe and the other
main GATT trading partners. Technology, software, services, and other functions may
be serviced by developing countries. At the same time, the extraordinary comparative
advantage enjoyed in the labor field by actors like China, which may marry low wages
with educational and other infrastructure, will heighten the pressure to protect the
domestic competitors in the U.S. and Europe through anti-dumping or safeguard
measures.143 The pressure on Doha to address development issues that go beyond the
original, efficiency based goals of the WTO can be explained in part by the rise of the
enablement of global economic opportunity as a norm of international commerce.
The action here still takes place within the Doha, but it necessitates a rethinking
of the norms and institutional structure of the WTO in light of the next generation of
trade cases that is sure to arise. The analysis here is akin to that which, as described
above, could have taken place at Bretton Woods if the trade planners and theoreticians
had looked at the system through the prism of the interaction between Statecraft and the
order of states. From the point of view of the present, future matters and interpretive
issues will include prominently cases “new protectionism,” driven by domestic demand
for governments to shelter domestic industry against the cheaper labor/good education
and infrastructure coming from the new trade actors.
Regrettably, the WTO is not sufficiently well equipped at the moment to address
this phenomenon. As explained above, the opening up of barriers to trade among the 20th
century main players resulted in the type of questions that necessitated the establishment
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of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Today, the new domestic protectionist pressures
will increasingly take the form of the use and abuse of anti-dumping, countervailing duty
or other safeguard clauses. This is a virtually inevitable result of the change in the global
commercial landscape. Simply put, the sheer number of such cases, as relates to even a
single country like China, is staggering, and there is no physical way for the DSB to
handle workload that the new world economy is bound to generate.
The first institutional change that a WTO system infused with the enablement of
economic opportunity as its animating norm would require, is the establishment of an
international trade administrative body. Most important is the extent to which the DSB
should be supplemented with professional administrative tribunals that would, ex ante,
review antidumping or safeguard determinations by a national authority. We should
inspire ourselves, consistent with the cross fertilization of international norms and
expertise that Professor Weiler wrote about some time ago, with experiments under the
NAFTA related to the application of countervailing duties for illegal subsidies, and the
difficulties (and advantages) inherent in the application of domestic law by supranational
institutions. Without such a system, the domestic pressures will thwart the spread of the
enablement of global economic opportunity and, just like trade before World War II, the
trade system of the WTO will have failed to graduate to a new era characterized by a
transformed economic and political landscape.
Beyond those adjustments to the WTO, the enablement of global economic
opportunity requires the trading partners to go beyond the WTO and establish a new set
of norms and institutions. In our view the first step towards finding a solution is to
establish a trade institutional structure of the future that lies outside of the WTO. The
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institutional structure must be diffuse, shifting with the needs of the day, in accord with
Statecraft within the main states that comprise the trading world and the transformed core
elements of Statecraft in the post-modern world. The challenge facing the trading
partners is to establish institutions that will accommodate not just trade between modern
nation-states, but trade in a post-modern world where diffuse economic by diffuse actors
generate an astonishing amount of issues. We believe the solution lies in a division of the
trade world along industry lines, and the establishment of a set of institutions that is
described below to address the issues that arise within each subject matter area.
The diffuseness of the post-modern world has created a global middle class which
is displacing the nation-state as the true interlocutor of trade. That middle class may be
conceptualized as gravitating around a number of discrete industries, each of which raises
a given set of issues on the global scale. Compare, for example, the fashion industry and
the pharmaceutical industry. The issues of the day in the fashion industry involve the
displacement of means of production to the Far East and other countries where cheap
labor abounds. To respond to competition, the high-end brands are lowering their
standards to tackle less luxurious markets. The mid-range brands are being squeezed out
of their markets from the top by those luxury brands, and by the generic competition that
come from the Far East. They are riding the tide, waiting for the new Far East players to
become importing forces that they can tackle. These issues require international
coordination of the type that the WTO cannot possibly supply.
The same need arises with respect to the pharmaceutical industry, albeit in an
entirely different context. There, the salient issues involve the extent to which companies
operating in certain states should be forced to shoulder health burdens from other states,
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in particular developing states. For example, may a generic company operating in India
reverse engineer a drug made by Merck, and manufacture that drug at a cheaper price?
Would India have the right to permit the grant of a sublicense to manufacture the same
drug to, say, an African company? Again, both industries face issues that require
international regulation, but in an entirely different context.
We believe that a new trade organization, comprised of a shifting membership
that is dictated by the industries at issues, should be put into plance. It should have nine
permanent trading partners (which we will refer to as the “Trade Commission”). The
trading members could be, by way of illustration: the European Union, the United States,
Brazil or an alliance of South and Latin American States, Australia, India, Indonesia, the
Arab League, Japan and an alliance of the Southeast Asian “tiger states,” and the African
Union. Each of these representatives comes from a region where the post-modern is
juxtaposed to the modern and pre-modern world. They could be supplemented by states
that are important actors in a particular industry, and address the issues that arise in
connection with that industry.
In each instance, the Commission will establish programs designed to establishing
the conditions necessary for the enablement of global economic opportunity. It is perhaps
a cliché to say that a Marshall Plan for 21st century is needed, but when one considers the
type of educational and infrastructural growth that is needed to promote the move to premodern societies of the type of industries that are spreading to modern societies such as
India, one can see that realistic training and foundational programs may go a long way
towards spreading economic opportunity to pre-modern societies.
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Next, the Commission could coordinate with other international institutions. In
the examples that we are providing above, the Commission would obviously coordinate
with the World Health Organization when it comes to pharmaceutical companies, and
with the International Labor Organization when it comes to fashion and textile. In
addition, the norm of enablement of global economic opportunity carries in its penumbra
other norms, such anti-corruption norms, that could be more effectively enforced by
cooperation between the Trade Commission and, say, the International Criminal Court.
The integration of various institutions to handle certain subject matter areas accord with
the diffuse nature of the post- modern world, and its tendency to allow for supranational
norms to interfere with domestic sovereignty in order to solve cross-border problems.
The cooperation with other international institutions will also address and rethink
concept of “trade and…” It is clear that we still cannot think of trade without thinking of
the environment, labor, consumer rights, and other potentially conflicting domestic norms
that grew out of Statecraft in the modern nation-state. How to handle the 20th century
generation of trade issues will continue to occupy us for years to come within the
framework of the WTO. However, in addition, the post-modern world necessitates that
we add to this domestic-to-international discussion an “international-to-international”
discussion. To take a clear example, monetary policy can no longer be thought about as
principally a domestic matter, which may require some international cooperation by
institutions operating independently of the trade governing body. Lack of control of the
market driven and other currency fluctuation is intricately linked to the proper flow of
trade, and it can have a devastating domino effect on a trade system that fails to pay
attention to it.
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The “trade and …” issues of the post-modern world will involve questions related
to “trade and international finance,” “trade and national debt” and other “trade and …”
questions where the other value used to be controlled by a domestic authority, which lost
in control and left an international vacuum. For example, the Trade Commission will
have to regulate, in coordination with central banks and other financial institutions, the
relative exchange rates of the main trading partners. The recent fall of the dollar,144 and
the inability or unwillingness of the traditional domestic institutions to stem the tide,
could deeply unsettle the trade world. Europe could lose a substantial market share in the
United States. China’s products, priced principally in dollars, could become even
cheaper than they are now, and more importantly the Chinese consumer would lose a
substantial amount of buying power vis-a-vis the European partners. While some
international institutions do exist to handle those issues, in today’s diffuse world there is
simply not enough institutional structure to address these issues effectively.
The shift in the trade world that we are advocating would anticipate and follow
the historical tide before change is forced upon it (possibly in an atmosphere of crisis).
While the inner constitutional and outward strategic transformation of the modern states
does not make Bretton Woods irrelevant (far from it), the liberal democracies must
recognize the need to adjust their trade strategy. The new world is diffuse. Its essential
players are no longer confined to the West.145 Strategically, the battleground has shifted
from defeating fascism and communism as alternative theories of the nation-state, to
defeating existential threats to the post-modern states in the form of terrorism and nuclear
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takeover. Sovereignty and balance of powers, which made for a world comprised of
discrete trading blocs that focused on a nation, are no longer the currency of the day.
Rather than a “North” and a “South,” we are faced today with diffuse blocs that
cut across traditional borders, coexist within borders, and form the new stage of our
political and economic evolution. From inward look and outward conquest (in the premodern era), via collaboration and creation of a balance bloc of sovereign nations in the
North (during the modern-era), we are entering a dynamic world where North and South
blend to create a diffuse society of post-modern states lying side by side with, and
containing within themselves, pre-modern societies.146
The fundamental challenge of the post-modern society of states will be to
preserve a world where the trading blocs, within the South and the North, continue to
grow and to contain countervailing forces – chief among them terrorism, the conduct of
asymmetric war (especially economic warfare) through terror, and the takeover of a
nuclear state by rogue forces. The strategic importance of consolidating a Northern bloc
of liberal democracies is no longer the top agenda of the day. We believe that, in order
for trade as the outer face of the state to follow the inner constitutional order of postmodern societies, and to further their foreign strategic goals, it must be reconfigured to
accept that the 21st century principal commercial interlocutors are the trading classes of
the North and the South (and, as mentioned below, the former communist states). Instead
of focusing on commerce between sovereign blocs within the North, trade must recognize
that trading forces within each post-market state are emanating North-South, NorthNorth, and increasingly “eastward” towards the former communist countries.
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At the same time, the emerging post-modern societies of the South are surrounded
by modern and, most importantly, enormous pockets of pre-modern blocs. These blocs
cut across state boundaries, and they are bound to be the center of the liberal
democracies’ strategic security interests.147 A trade system that continues to focus on a
trading bloc developed out of the modern nation-states’ wars cannot meet the challenges
of the 21st century. Put otherwise, the failure to proactively adjust trade to recognize the
new, diffuse North-South lines, may be viewed in ten, twenty, or thirty years (after we
have endured a catastrophic event such as a Pakistani-launched nuclear assault or the
development of a lethal Indonesian terrorist group that is not contained by that state’s
middle class) as an error of magnitude similar to the Treaty of Versailles. The infusion of
a new value and institution to the trade system follows the inner and outer evolution of
the modern liberal democratic state in the 21st century, before a catastrophic world event
makes this move obvious, just like Bretton Woods and the Marshall Plan did in the 21st
century.
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Conclusion
Once the global collectivity sets in motion a new trade order of states, it will have
triggered a new cycle which, like Bretton Woods, will generate novel substantive and
institutional issues and, over time, transform Statecraft, undergo additional
metamorphoses of its own, and ultimately give rise to another constitutional era. History
in fact never ends, but it pauses sufficiently for each generation to recognize its place in
the evolutionary path, and to organize its law, international order and institutions to
reflect the needs of the moment.
In this Article, we have identified constitutional mechanisms that affect Statecraft,
the order of states and transformative and evolutionary patterns that are borne out of this
constitutional interaction. Further, we have articulated what we believe to be the seminal
contours of the constitutional order of the early 21st century. Today’s mission is to build
a system for coming generations, keeping in mind that when we take on the unavoidable
task of transforming the current order we also plant the seeds of an equally inevitable
future constitutional metamorphosis.
It goes without saying that further study, thought and analysis will go into
creating the architecture, frame and construction of the new system. Experts in each
industry will identify the salient needs and submit to policy-makers and negotiators with
the choices that face them. Finance and currency thinkers will study the transformed
international and domestic landscape and produce the nuts and bolts of the new order.
Institutional theorists will analyze the various means of breathing life to the new norms
through transformed institutions. To be sure, the current system will continue to operate,
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and the comparative advantage enterprise to unfold. Changes would have to be made on
this front as well to reflect the transformed nature of the State, such as a revision of the
rules of origin, balance of payment and other provisions that were devised for a nationstate centric system. However, in time, the GATT will have achieved its integration
purpose, and the central action on the international scene will focus on how best to spread
global economic opportunity.
The new order will not arise overnight. When Robert Schuman declared his
vision of a constitutionally transformed Europe, he pointedly prophesized that Europe
would be built through a series of “concrete achievements” which, over time, would yield
a new legal order that he visualized in 1950 as the “United States of Europe.” The
interaction of the various European institutions, the resolution of crises such as the
Luxembourg constitutional breakdown of the 1960a, and the random workings of the
political process, infused into the system an element of randomness on the road to the
inevitable result: its acceptance by the constituent entities. The same animating
principles will obtain in the international order of states that we are discussing.
We can already predict certain developments, albeit with no clear view of their
timing and exact nature. With the erosion of the nation-state as the central unit of the
system, the place of both individuals and private organizations in the international order
will continue to solidify. International rules will likely rise in prominence and become
increasingly available to private parties in actions against one another and against
institutional players. New international financing institutions may arise to spread
economic opportunity to pre-modern areas. Acceptance of the rule of law may become
an even greater precondition to participation in the trade order. Partnership among states,
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international institutions and private actors will take forms we can only glimpse from the
vantage point of the present. Borders might have to be redrawn, and states might accept
economic boundaries that are much broader and more diffuse than their political
boundaries. The geographical landscape that we inherited from the colonial era and the
wars of the 20th century might well become unrecognizable.
The future evolution of states and trade will surely face setbacks if not crises.
But by paying heed to the evolving course of history, we stand a greater chance to steer it
towards a better course. No doubt, we will continue to struggle with poverty, violence,
terror, inequalities, catastrophes, and all other permanent attributes of the human
condition. However, by recognizing the fundamental mechanisms that drive our
domestic and international orders, we will have done all we can to organize ourselves as
best as possible to face an uncertain future.
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